Donation trust center
Beginner-first and technical verification flow for donation addresses.
Trust status
Proof ID: 2026-03-01-main
Published: 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC
Valid from: 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC
Last verified: 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC
Quick verify (beginner path)
- Download the statement, signature, and signing key files.
- Import key, then run verify command shown below.
- Confirm the fingerprint exactly matches the pinned value.
Expected pass outcome: Good signature and exact fingerprint match. If either fails, do not donate.
Verification files
| File | SHA-256 | Size |
|---|---|---|
| /donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt | e53a0a753807fc5fea896b0525d70fca05ca04b7a24634f89c57c8037c2ea0fc | 736 |
| /donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt.asc | 57177b542fb8703bf7c9d1c175c70e5c797a3a14e0491681a9a1c1d111ba1e71 | 455 |
| /donate-proof/v1/signing-key.asc | a8785e2f07c0800fc3ee758cbe78b78cf1cc21db3de47217839a4c94671d21ff | 474 |
| /donate-proof/v1/README.txt | b80dda16172a2eb2706829e159b59b38bd6515099b125ee8d538657f60d2f118 | 753 |
Key identity
Fingerprint: 9A6E8E58D9D5F39E3FAE6F53A4C71C62C5B5E941
Key ID: A4C71C62C5B5E941
Algorithm: RSA-4096
First seen: 2026-02-20 00:00:00 UTC
Rotation policy: old keys remain available in archive with retirement or revocation notes.
Advanced verification
Linux/macOS commands
curl -O /donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt curl -O /donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt.asc curl -O /donate-proof/v1/signing-key.asc gpg --import donate-proof/v1/signing-key.asc gpg --verify donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt.asc donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt
Windows commands
curl.exe -O /donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt curl.exe -O /donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt.asc curl.exe -O /donate-proof/v1/signing-key.asc gpg --import donate-proof/v1/signing-key.asc gpg --verify donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt.asc donate-proof/v1/addresses.txt
Offline workflow: download files, disconnect network, run GPG verification locally.
If verification fails
- Stop. Do not send funds.
- Do not trust screenshots or copied social-media addresses.
- Reload the official domain and repeat verification.
- Check status page for key rotation notes.
Common scam patterns
- Screenshot address replacement or edited chat screenshots.
- Mirror domains serving stale proof bundles from old cache.
- Clipboard malware replacing pasted wallet addresses.
- Lookalike domain names with fake "verified" badges.
Threat model and limits
This proof model protects against silent address replacement and stale artifact confusion. It does not protect against compromised devices, malicious extensions, or phishing domains that users trust manually.
Address list in current proof
| Network | Address |
|---|---|
| Bitcoin (BTC) | bc1qpdfchangerexample8h4x4n7qk0r6xw2f6f0p7m3q9a |
| Ethereum (ETH) | 0x7E57f6BfA3f8e7864A6f5F0469C88b3d4A58cB2E |
| Monero (XMR) | 89aJ9N9dYcXPPDFChangerExampleYwR9FoJ8jCQ4fVQk3v7eML6zvQxR1VdAayhE2qkGgKV9Yv7QzYt8fYXs5U7nYmxnq6Gr3m |
Archive links
Open proof archive for prior proofs, old keys, and revocation history.